/UploadFiles/XXGL/2012/10/人大社12年10月新书快递12-《人性论》1.doc

书名：人性论（上、下）            
书号：978-7-300-16414-4
著者：[英] 大卫?休谟 著
韩东晖 王彬彬 导读    
责任编辑：商希建
成品：148*210  页数：691
纸张：70克轻型纸
装祯：平装
出版时间：2012年9月
定价：（上、下）55.00元
出版社：中国人民大学出版社

◆ 本书卖点
? 大卫?休谟对于知觉、情感和道德三大主题的哲学探讨
? 全面精彩的中文导读
? 学习英语的珍贵资料

◆ 读者定位
1．全国高等院校英语及相关专业学生
2. 高等院校非英语专业英语学习者及同等英语水平学习者
3. 广大外语教师
4. 哲学、文化、政治及法律等各领域的研究学者及学生

◆ 作者简介
大卫?休谟（1711－1776），英国哲学家、经济学家和历史学家，被视为英国启蒙运动以及西方哲学历史中最重要的人物之一，与法国的伏尔泰和卢梭是同时代人。他与贝克莱一样是从洛克的经验论出发的，不过他在经验论上比洛克和贝克莱更彻底，合乎逻辑地得出了怀疑主义的结论。与约翰?洛克及乔治?贝克莱并称三大英国经验主义者。
◆ 内容简介
《人性论》是休谟一生中最重要的著作。书中作者试图通过对人性的研究来揭示制约人的理智、情感和道德行为的准则。全书分为三卷：“论知性”，阐述了他的怀疑论和经验主义认识论；第二卷“论情感”，提出情感而非理性是善和美的基础；第三卷“论道德”，论述了快乐论、功利论的伦理学理论以及人性论、约定论的政治学理论。
◆ 简要目录
INTRODUCTION
BOOK I  OF THE UNDERSTANDING
PART I  OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC.
PART II  OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME
PART III  OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY
PART IV  OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY
BOOK II  OF THE PASSIONS
PART I  OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY
PART II  OF LOVE AND HATRED
PART III  OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS
BOOK III  OF MORALS
ADVERTISEMENT
PART I  OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL
PART II  OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
PART III  OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES
APPENDIX

◆ 上架建议
外语/哲学/畅销书

书摘
SECT. I
Of the Origin of our Ideas.
All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; tho’ it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.
There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts. Tho’ a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all united together in this apple, ’tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.
Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects, we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are double., and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation. Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a moment.